今日美國哲學與人文科學（英文）
作者：Stanley
文章來源：哲學在線
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Philosophy and the Humanities in the United States Today (J. Stanley)
In my last few posts, I have been raising a contentious issue. Consider the CVs of philosophers in the United States working in the 1970s and 1980s publishing on core metaphysical and epistemological issues of the sort discussed by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, or issues in philosophical logic and philosophy of language of the sort discussed by Aristotle, Abelard, Ockham, Frege, Husserl, Brentano, and Russell. You will see that they had good success rates in national competitions for humanities fellowships. And why not? After all, philosophy is a distinctive human intellectual pursuit, and a core humanities subject. But if you look at, say, the past ten years, you will find that philosophers working on such issues have been particularly unsuccessful in similar competitions. The philosophers who do achieve some success have been those working primarily in ethics related topics, historians of philosophy, or philosophers who have related their work to art or literature. The latter are subjects which, since Plato’s time, have been traditionally opposing kinds of humanities disciplines to philosophy. Yet the only way for a philosopher working on skepticism or the nature of universals to obtain funding from an American humanities institute is to link her work with literary criticism, painting, or French cultural anthropology.
This is just an indication of a broader problem in the humanities in the United States. The problem is that we have a generation of humanities academics in this country who have no sense at all of what the discipline of philosophy is. They have no sense of what kinds of considerations have been advanced for and against skepticism, no sense of the traditional problem of universals, and no sense of the development of logic beyond the syllogism. Not only do they have no conception of what is happening now with such discussions, they have no understanding of the detailed intellectual work done by the great philosophers of the past; they simply don’t know how to read philosophy. Spending two months trying to figure out the argument in, say, Hume’s 「Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses」, or Kant’s Second Analogy, is a completely foreign pursuit. Far from being ashamed of this lack of knowledge, they seem to revel in it. One might wonder how a successful academic who has worked on T.S. Eliot could boast of their complete ignorance of (say) Bradley’s regress problem, when Eliot wrote his dissertation on Bradley (under the tutelage of Bertrand Russell, among others), but I have met in fact met such a person.
Ignorance breeds contempt. When I meet a philosopher who boasts of her ignorance of (say) Roman history, Wallace Stevens, or Emily Dickinson, I'm embarrassed for her. I'm similarly embarrassed for the professor of comparative literature who boasts of her ignorance of G.E. Moore or is proud that she has no idea what contributions Gottlob Frege has made to philosophy. Of course, it’s perfectly fine for a philosopher to confess that she doesn’t enjoy poetry, and it’s equally in order for a literary critic to confess that she doesn’t enjoy the topics discussed in Aristotle’s metaphysics, or Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. What would not be acceptable is for a philosopher who doesn’t enjoy poetry to mount a campaign against poetry. But that is exactly what is happening in the United States today; academics with no detailed knowledge or interest in the humanities discipline of philosophy are using whatever resources are at their disposal to delegitimize it. Just as it is embarrassing to be confronted by an American academic who scoffs at the study of Shakespeare or Chinese history, it’s equally embarrassing to be confronted by an American academic who scoffs at the study of vagueness, skepticism, or the problem of intentionality. Ignorance or disinterest in a subject is not something one should seek to legitimize by eliminating the study of the subject matter.
Posted by Jason Stanley on July 14, 2006 at 08:45 AM in Guest Bloggers: Marcus and Jason Stanley, The Academy | Permalink
Comments
"...they have no sense of the development of logic beyond the syllogism".
After more than a decade in academics, I can't say I've met any colleagues from other departments who knew about the development of logic up to the syllogism, either.
Other than giving them too much credit, I think you're right about all this.
Posted by: morethan | July 14, 2006 at 10:56 AM
Jason,
I think your point is well taken, and I think everyone shares your lament for a deficit in general philosophical knowledge; but to be fair, I see no evidence that "academics with no detailed knowledge or interest in the humanities discipline of philosophy are using whatever resources are at their disposal to delegitimize it." It seems to be the case, rather, that philosophers in the US tend to work with little concern to what their colleagues in the other humanities are doing and vice versa. In contrast to, for example, France, where sociologists(eg. Pierre Bourdieu), historians (e.g. Marc Bloch and the Analles School) and psychologists (Piaget, Lacan) either studied philosophy or had more than a passing familiarity and philosophers (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault) were well acquainted to ultra-philosophical humanistic pursuits of their time. For better or worse, there seems to be a division of intellectual labour in America, which breeds its own kinds of problems (e.g. the near-complete absence of philosophical ideas from intellectual or political discourse, and the conspicuous lack of synoptic philosophical projects of the greek or german variety which attempt to unify or order the disciplines). If you're proposing a programmatic change to the way philosophy is done in America, I'm sure you'll find nothing but supporters and well-wishers; me included. It will, however require some leading by example - so I guess there will be no more picking on comparative literature or english majors (yes, I know it's going to be hard.)
Best,
Kosta Calfas
Posted by: Kosta Calfas | July 14, 2006 at 11:28 AM
Prof. Stanley,
As a student of philosophy at a major research university, I (perhaps) feel this type of ignorance even more. I have applied for several research scholarships and have received nothing. My faculty advisors tell me things like, "you should expect to not get anything because your research isn't 'applied'," or, "if you're not working on a project that is going to either produce some kind of technology or further our understanding of some literary figure, don't expect to get any money from the university." I am both saddened and angered by this open contempt for philosophy. Nonetheless, I somewhat expect such behaviour from the low-level administrators that decide upon my types of scholarships. It is even more shocking that 'high-level' academics who decide upon the major humanities research grants would show such contempt and ignorance. It makes me sad for my future career as an academic philosopher.
Best,
Errol
Posted by: Errol Lord | July 14, 2006 at 12:16 PM
To echo some of what Kosta says, if one is upset about being misunderstood and underappreciated, it's going to take some work on professional philosophy's part to straighten the mess out. The rest of academia isn't going to feel sorry that they've been misrepresenting philosophy and come to its senses. That means teaching undergraduates to appreciate analytic philosophy instead of ignoring them or belittling them as "not suited for philosophy". It also means being willing to explain what one is doing to colleagues in a way that isn't necessarily publishable in Mind. Look, I'm part of this tradition. Not only do we as analytic philosophers need to be better communicators, but we also need to be willing to communicate.
Analytic philosophy has chosen to go in the direction of other specialized disciplines, craving increasingly lower course loads, more time off, and a job isn't "great" unless it includes almost exclusively graduate teaching. This might work if we'd done a long period of PR over the last century to explain why the necessary aposteriori is a big deal. But that didn't happen and now the job, the duty (because the survival of our way of doing philosophy hangs on every person who must explain "vagueness" to a dean). But most professional philosophers think that their duty stops after they've published technically complex articles and taught the next generation of grad students and that it's mean or misunderstanding to ask them to do more. If we want people to have the luxury of doing what people working on philosophy in the top programs do, we've got to do better at communicating why it's important. Because it is important. So far, ethics seems to be able to do that, as does political philosophy, and history of philosophy to some extent.
It sucks that we have to do it. Someone should have done it before us so we don't have to -- putting Frege and Quine's actual arguments nearer to the front of undergraduate experience. But no one did. And now we can either wallow in the misery that it wasn't done, or get off the horse and walk the trail. It will filter up, but it takes time and effort, a lot less contempt, occasional humility, and established analytic philosophers (who will then write three top journal articles a year rather than four) to step up to the plate.
Posted by: Adam Potthast | July 14, 2006 at 12:32 PM
I wonder how much this is a distinctively American problem.
In both Britain and Australia philosophers have been very successful in getting grants, including very large grants. Consider, for example, the Federation Fellowships that Huw Price, David Chalmers and Paul Griffiths were awarded, or the large grant that went to Arche at St Andrews, or the large Leverhulme grants that philosophers across Britain have received.
I don't know whether that's because philosophers there are held in higher esteem qua humanities scholars, or because they aren't being considered as such. But I will note (something that surprised me) that the Leverhulme grants to Jon Williamson (on probabilistic networks) and Crispin Wright (to translate Frege) were listed as humanities grants.
Posted by: Brian Weatherson | July 14, 2006 at 12:34 PM
Paranoid Hypothesis: Postmodernism is even more pervasive in American humanities departments now than in the past, and postmodernists dislike philosophy as practiced by philosophers. So when a philosophy project in M and E comes up for grant review, the postmodernists on the review board reject it.
More Likely Hypothesis: Adam is right. Philosophy has marginalized itself as a discipline over the past 100 years. It's our fault. (Or, it's our advisors' and their advisors' fault, but we inherit the responsibility of resolving it.)
Posted by: Jason | July 14, 2006 at 12:45 PM
Kosta,
I am certainly not "proposing a programmatic change to the way philosophy is done in America"! The way philosophy is done in America is similar to the way it has been done for centuries. Of course there are differences. For example, there are many branches of philosophy now that have less to do with Christianity than before (though of course there are many that still do), and philosophers have also made progress on many questions. The advent of scientific discoveries changes both the sorts of questions and the sorts of answers that are available. It's harder to unify and order the disciplines now than in Aristotle's time, since there is far more specialized knowledge (and I'm certain that our colleagues in neighboring humanities disciplines would be even more reluctant to fund such projects, since many of the disciplines are scientific ones). But most of the topics at the center of discussion in American philosophy are ones that have been at the center of discussion of philosophy for centuries. Many of the great philosophers of recent american philosophy have had grand synoptic projects (e.g. David Lewis, most obviously). Claims that philosophy in America is radically distinct from philosophy as it always has been are either trivially true (because each generation and culture approaches the fundamental philosophical questions in its own distinctive way), or obviously false claims propounded by people ignorant of both the history of philosophy and its present.
Posted by: Jason Stanley | July 14, 2006 at 12:52 PM
Is that entirely fair? Shouldn't we account for things like the number of movements in 20th century philosophy that explicitly aimed at taking philosophy from being a core humanities discipline and making it a science? Or what about the difference between analytic philosophers and other humanists in positions taken in the "culture wars" and the "science wars"? I'm not trying to condemn either side, here, but it just seems like there are forces in philosophy that have also been making the relationship with the rest of the humanities uncomfortable.
Posted by: Matt Brown | July 14, 2006 at 12:53 PM
I want to second what Adam writes above. But also qualify it in some way. I, as an historian of philosophy, am used to having to justify my research interests and to explain why what I'm interested in is interesting, and that's to other philosophers. It makes it easier to write grant proposals (which are often read by a committee of humanities people) that explain why the project should be funded. (And I have been succesful in getting grants.) Many analytic philosophers (and Jason, I don't think you are one of them) are not particularly good at explaining why their philosophical interests are important, rather than obscure or arcane. They take, say, the importance of metaphysics to be self-evident. It is important, but I also think it is worth taking the time to articulate why anyone who isn't already interested should care. If as a profession we all worked a bit harder on the 'why should I care?' philosophers would have a better rep.
Two stories: (1) Have a look at how the sports French press covered the Zidane episode at the end of the World Cup, and at Zidane's interview with Canal +. It is a meditation on the nature of responsibility and blameworthiness. I cannot imagine a US sports hero saying anything near so interesting. (2) Bar conversation a week ago with a Kiwi there to watch the NZ-Aus rugby match. I was basically interrogated about what philosophy was, and what use it was -- why anyone would take a course in philosophy. The tone was not antagonistic but curious. And at the end of the conversation the guy thought philosophy was valuable for teaching students how to think. I think philosophy is more than that, but its a good start.
Posted by: LS | July 14, 2006 at 05:58 PM
Maybe the problem is not so much an animus against analytic philosophy as that when it comes to work in core problem areas, people don't think they can tell the difference between good and bad, between lasting value and passing fad. Or even if they have their own opinions, they don't think they can sell their judgments to the rest of the committee. Think of some people who you think might deserve these awards. For any one of them, half the profession would think it was a big mistake. Some of you have said that the situation is different now than in the past or different in the US than in other countries, and that, I admit, does count against my hypothesis, but maybe those are more clubbish places and times.
Posted by: Christopher Gauker | July 14, 2006 at 07:27 PM
I think Jason hit the nail on the head in his comments to an earlier post: he noted John Lach's observation that philosophers often cut each other down and in doing so undermine the profession's status in the eyes of other academics. (BTW, Lach's letter to the APA is at: http://www.politicaltheory.info/essays/lachs.htm)
But isn't something like that going on here? There's an unfortunate tendency to dismiss applied philosophy (etc.) as not being "real" philosophy, or not what "real" philosophers do, or as somehow not really representing what philosophy is about. Meanwhile, what counts as "real" philosophy is often written for a small specialized audience. But these attitudes only harm philosophy by diminishing its relevance for those outside the field.
In fact, these attitudes may be a reaction to what Lachs observed: if one can narrow down one's prospective audience then one also limits the number of critics. Unfortunately, that means one also limits the breadth of one's audience outside philosophy. And, let's face it, many (not all) philosophers who have managed to reach a wider audience are mocked by other philosophers (Rorty is the classic example) while those who write for a hyper-specialized subset of philosophers can be widely respected by other philosophers, even by those who don't read their articles.
I agree with earlier commentators who've suggested that professional philosophy is partly to blame for its own marginalization. I have colleagues outside philosophy who deeply appreciate what philosophy has to offer - but with our teaching loads and other responsibilities simply don't have time to immerse themselves in philosophy, especially philosophy that doesn't attempt to be applied or cross-disciplinary. And, frankly, I don't blame them.
Posted by: John Capps | July 14, 2006 at 07:55 PM
"Art [and] literature ... are subjects which, since Plato’s time, have been traditionally opposing kinds of humanities disciplines to philosophy."
This sweeping historical claim seems overblown to me. It's true that Plato has some harsh things to say in the Republic about "mimetic art". But this may or may not include all kinds of art (e.g., music, abstract decorative art, architecture and poems in praise of the gods may not count as "mimetic art" as Plato understands it). Anyway, practically no philosophers followed Plato on this. And Plato surely wasn't conceiving of mimetic art as a "humanities discipline". At least in the West, the invention of an intellectual discipline that was concerned with the study of literature was basically due to the "Poetics" of Aristotle.
During most of the history of philosophy, there hardly existed an established intellectual discipline concerned with studying art and literature. To the extent that it existed, it was usually closely connected with philosophy. (Think of how deeply Schiller's writings on aesthetics and literary theory were influenced by Kant.) It was not until the 20th century that a large discipline devoted to the academic study of literature sprang up, and it was only then that it started to harbour the enemies of philosophy.
By the way, our enemies in the humanities aren't just limited to post-modern literary theorists and their ilk. Historians, even of a quite traditional stamp, are often quick to accuse analytic philosophers of being "ahistorical". Sad, but true...
Posted by: Ralph Wedgwood | July 14, 2006 at 09:54 PM
A quick point. In spite of the hundreds or thousands of poems I've read, I don't believe I read or understand poetry in the way that those who study literature do. I think many professors of English are able to see things in Dickinson that I'm not able to see, that they have a technical language and tools to think about literature that I don't have. (And I'm not thinking about postmodernism here, I'm thinking about the classical tools used to analyze literature). I double-majored English and Philosophy. I love poetry. But I can't really claim I know how to READ poetry in a way that far outstrips the ability of most English professors to read philosophy.
As for art history or music, I'm fairly hopeless. I know as much as your average man on the street.
Like most philosophers I know, when it comes to a serious knowledge of things that other people take as central to the humanities--art, music, what have you--I have to shrug my shoulders and take a pass. If I'm going to dabble, I try to learn about history and economics. I don't court ignorance, I just accept that ignorance is an almost unavoidable thing in life. My ignorance of many significant disciplines in the humanities probably matches the ignorance other people have about philosophy. I know some stuff about what they do; I can't do what they do. I'd be surprised if this wasn't true for most of us.
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